




Home, James, and don’t spare the horses: The inevitability of a second 
Sydney casino 
 
ABSTRACT: Casinos have become an important yet controversial element of many contemporary metropoles, 
with cities on the Pacific Rim no exception. Twenty years after the opening of Sydney’s first casino, 
construction of its second is currently underway on a contentious site, the Barangaroo precinct. This paper offers 
a historical analysis of the current casino project against the backdrop of casino development in Australia 
general, comparing the current project to the development of Sydney’s first casino, The Star (formerly Star 
City). We argue that both have been predicated on a cosmopolitan gaze contributing to the image of a ‘global 
city’ and the promise of increased tax revenues. As a result, planning processes have lacked legitimacy, 
particularly in the case of Crown, which involves the use of significant public assets. This paper critiques the 
spectacle of iconic developments of both The Star at Pyrmont and Crown Casino at Barangaroo when set against 
the morphology and urban form, suggesting that a more sincere engagement with the specificity of place on 
major developments would mitigate against the polarising effects of contested urban projects. 
 




The controversy of the Barangaroo development in Sydney, New South Wales (NSW) has 
thus far put the spotlight on the successive Liberal-National Coalition state governments that 
prima facie have granted carte blanche to Lendlease, the Sydney-based multinational 
corporation that in 2009 was selected by the Barangaroo Delivery Authority (BDA) to 
develop the Barangaroo South precinct (BDA 2013; Lendlease n.d.a.; n.d.b.).1 Mike Baird, 
                                                 
1 The Barangaroo Delivery Authority (BDA) is a statutory corporation of the NSW state parliament and was 






the recently retired2 NSW State Premier, followed from his predecessor Barry O’Farrell3 in 
continuing this trajectory. On 26 November 2015 the [then] Premier Baird allowed further 
height and floor space increases (McKenny and Saulwick 2015), the latter of which had 
previously been doubled from the time of first submission. The potential for a casino within 
the Barangaroo development was first put forward in 2009 in an unsolicited proposal to the 
NSW Government (Chew 2015). Commenting at the time, the [then] Premier O’Farrell stated 
of the proposal by James Packer, then Chair of Crown: 
 
He’s put a proposal forward that is unique … that would see a six-star hotel – something this city 
doesn’t have – located at Barangaroo and yes, part of that proposal would be [an] Asian high-
roller’s room … This will be a VIP-only facility … there will be no poker machines (O’Farrell, in 
ABC 2017a). 
 
Planning approval for the concept plan was granted for the eighth modification (MOD8) in 
June 2016 (Department of Planning 2016).  
The Barangaroo development has prompted critical observations from Pham (2015) and 
Johnston and Clegg (2012), the former concerned with the social impact of its built form, the 
latter examining the effect upon public management of the placement of Sydney as a ‘global 
city’. These studies form part of a larger emerging body of work on Australian gambling and 
its venues (Livingstone 2005; Markham, Doran, and Young 2014) in Macau (Simpson 2014; 
Schneider 2015) and Singapore (Henderson 2012).  
                                                 
2 Premier Mike Baird resigned the premiership and retired from politics on 19 January 2017, citing family 
reasons (see NSW Government 2017b). On 28 February 2017 the National Australia Bank (NAB) announced 
that Baird would commence with them in an executive role in mid-April 2017 (ABC News 2017b). 
3 Barry O’Farrell resigned as Premier on 16 April 2014 following revelations in the course of an inquiry being 
conducted by the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) that the [then] Premier had 
received a gift of a bottle of Penfold’s Grange wine valued at A$3,000 from Australian Water Holdings (AWH) 
executive Di Girolamo (see ABC News 2014) Arguably, this episode exemplified a period in NSW political 
history that was marked by allegations of corruption and poor governance at the level of state politics (see, for 
example, Grant, Ryan and Lawrie 2015; McKlymont and Besser 2014). Drew (2015, 63) noted that even then 
the instability at the level of state politics had been responsible for obfuscating planning procedure around 






Against the background of casino development in Australia and the Asia Pacific Rim 
and in Sydney in particular, this article critically examines the process and putative outcomes 
of Crown’s casino at Barangaroo East. The paper is divided into six main parts. In Section 2 
we provide an historical account of the development of casinos in Australia. Section 3 
examines the immediate spatial context of the Darling Harbour waterfront in Sydney that is 
also the location of Sydney’s first casino, The Star (formerly Star City), before considering 
the Pyrmont-Ultimo precinct. Section 4 provides an account of the Barangaroo development. 
Section 5 then places the Australian experience of casino development in the global context, 
considering the hegemony of global over local alongside the power of cosmopolitan image. 
We challenge the claim of spectacle and iconicity of the development and provide an account 
of the socioeconomic impacts of casinos in Sydney’s city centre. Section 6 concludes by 
calling for reform to the delivery of major projects to realise the potential of a resilient global 
city. 
2 History: Casinos in Australia 
In recent history, major developments in Sydney have been mired in controversy and conflict: 
Darling Harbour in the 1980s (Daly and Malone 1996; Boydell and Searle 2010) and Star 
City Casino in the 1990s (Lynch and Veal 1998; Searle and Bounds 1999; Searle and Byrne 
2002), and now Barangaroo precinct beginning in the late 2000s (Johnston and Clegg 2012; 
Pham 2015). The NSW Government’s shift in economic strategy, from industrial production 
and trade to finance, information services and tourism (Daly and Malone 1996, 94–95), has 
changed the urban landscape in the Pyrmont-Darling Harbour fan at the edge of Sydney’s 
CBD, throwing a blanket over the site’s industrial heritage in a staged transformation to a 
mixed-use precinct offering ample opportunity for business and consumption (see, for 





Commensurate with this transformation, historically there have been three clear stages 
of casino development in Australia: the first in the 1970s with the opening of casinos in 
Hobart and Darwin; the second in the 1980s with Launceston, Alice Springs, Gold Coast, 
Perth, Adelaide and Townsville all introducing casinos; and the third commencing in the mid-
1990s with Canberra, Melbourne, Sydney and Cairns. Australia is now experiencing its 
fourth stage of development, including new casinos being constructed or planned in Brisbane, 
Canberra and Sydney. Table 1 depicts these stages, as well as noting the legal basis for the 
establishment of the casinos, the parent companies and the licensing and exclusivity 
agreements for each. 
Table 1 Casinos in Australia: Stage of development, legislative basis, ownership, 
licencing and exclusivity 
 






Licensing and exclusivity 
STAGE 1: 1970s 






Federal Group The Deed of Agreement between the 
Crown and Federal Hotels Pty Ltd 
provides exclusive rights for the 
Federal Group to operate table 
gaming, gaming machines and Keno 

























Federal Group The Deed of Agreement between the 
Crown and Federal Hotels Pty Ltd 
provides exclusive rights for the 
Federal Group to operate table 
gaming, gaming machines and Keno 














Northern NT division exclusivity until 
2015. 
STAGE 2: 1980s 








The current licence term is until 2085. 
Exclusivity across SA until 2015 with 
right to receive compensation for any 
diminution of value for any change to 
the exclusivity.  












Licence awarded in perpetuity. A 10 
year regional casino gaming 
exclusivity agreement expired in 1996. 











Exclusivity within a 400 km radius 
granted in 1986 for 15 years, with the 
exception of Cairns which was only 








1987 Casino Control 












The State must not grant another 
licence to a casino and hotel of similar 
size and standard as Burswood within 
a 100km radius of Burswood. 











Crown Casino Publishing and 
Broadcasting 
Ltd. 




1994 Casino Control 
Act 2006 (ACT) 




A 99-year lease on licence with 






Act 1992 (NSW 
Government) 
Star City Casino Tabcorp 
Holdings Ltd. 
The casino licence was originally 
awarded to Sydney Harbour Casino 
Pty Ltd for 99 years from 1994, with 
12 year exclusivity in NSW. In late 
2007 the exclusivity arrangement was 
extended for another 12 years until 
2019. 






Conrad Treasury Conrad Jupiters A 75-year licence was awarded in 
1995. A ten year exclusivity period 
was also awarded for casino gaming 
within a 60 kilometre radius of the 
location (now expired). 
STAGE 4: 2010s 
New South 
Wales 
2010-expected Casino Control 
Act 1992 (NSW 
Government) 
Crown Casino Crown Resorts A 99-year lease on license beginning 
2019. 











25-year exclusivity from 
commencement of operations for 
60km from the Brisbane CBD and a 
99-year lease on license. This will be a 
direct replacement of the Conrad 
Treasury Casino. 
 
Sources: Crown Resorts 2014; Echo Entertainment Group 2015; Queensland Government 2015; Productivity 
Commission 2010. 
 
Examining Table 1, the first phase was marked by the regional capital cities of Hobart in 
Tasmania and Darwin in the Northern Territory opening modest casinos. Wrest Point Hotel 
Casino was validated and marketed as a destination casino, with the hope of tempting tourists 
to the Island State to pass through Hobart as a gateway, then to travel to see the island’s 
natural wonders (Hall and Hamon 1996, 31). Yet this did not come to fruition, with the 
failing business model prompting the owners to request an Electronic Gaming Machine 
(EGM) license that was subsequently granted by the state (Retail Traders Association 1998). 





alongside engendering the casino’s primary client base as residents of Hobart (Retail Traders 
Association 1998).  
There has been little written about the scope of impacts for the Skycity Casino in 
Darwin, perhaps a comment on its geographic isolation and relative obscurity in Australian 
economic development, although the data collected for casinos in the Northern Territory 
suggest extremely skewed impacts of gambling upon the region’s residents (Productivity 
Commission 2010, 394). Despite this dearth of research, in essence the casino tourist model 
in Darwin also failed to attract repeat visitors, a situation that also played out at the Cairns 
casino in the 1990s (Heazle in Hannigan 2005, 174). Stage 1 also witnessed that 
establishment of a small casino in Tasmania and the Northern Territory, the Country Club in 
Launceston and Lasseters in Alice Springs. 
Despite the poor performance of the casino-tourist model, the second phase witnessed a 
series of medium-sized casinos receiving approval and being established in the larger cities of 
Perth in Western Australia, Adelaide in South Australia and the Gold Coast and Townsville 
in Queensland in the 1980s. These casinos were developed in line with and modelled after 
European casinos, informed by a consideration of social impacts alongside those of capital 
accumulation (Hall and Hamon 1996, 31).  
Arguably, the early 1990s marked a tipping point in the production of consumption 
(Lynch and Veal 1998, 191; Productivity Commission 2010, 2.1), with the major capitals 
responding with large, resort-style casinos in Crown’s Melbourne Casino, The Star in Sydney 
and Conrad Treasury in Brisbane. This third wave of casino development mirrored the 
American model (McMillan, in USRC 2000, 54), with greater emphasis placed upon profits 
in the climate of increasing regional and global competition. The current developments – 
what we are denoting as the fourth phase – are now looking to the Orient, attempting to 





While the central concern of this discussion is casinos in Australia, and at Barangaroo 
in particular, it is important to emphasise that establishments facilitating gambling are no new 
plaything in Australia, with local registered clubs – essentially non-profit community 
organisations ostensibly operated to benefit local citizens – incrementally sanctioned to 
operate Electronic Gaming Machines (EGMs) across six of Australia’s seven jurisdictions. 
NSW was the first state to legalise EGMs in clubs in 1956 (USRC 2000, 49). This prompted 
an influx of inter-jurisdictional tourism from across the Queensland and Victorian borders 
(USRC 2000, 49). Seeing their missed opportunity to capture tax revenue, other states 
followed suit, allowing EGMs in clubs and hotels as well as in casinos, with Western 
Australia the only state to reserve the operation of EGMs strictly to casinos (Walker 1998, 
21). This led to an expediential growth in the gambling industry across Australia in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, from approximately A$7 billion in 1988–89 to A$17 billion in 1998–
99, then to A$19 billion in 2008–09 (Productivity Commission 2010, 2.1). Arguably, in 
jurisdictions other than Western Australia the differences between clubs on the one hand and 
casinos on the other hand have become hard to discern, with the design of the clubs following 
that of the casinos, favouring spectacle and environments of consumption overlaid with 
surveillance and control (Klein 2004, 15).  
Despite being mimicked by other outlets (clubs, hotels), casinos comprise a relatively 
small component of the gambling industry in Australia overall – hence the tax revenues 
generated from them.4 For example, the Productivity Commission (2010, 2.5) calculated that, 
notwithstanding differences across jurisdictions, casinos accounted for only A$3.5 billion or 
18% of all expenditure on major forms of gambling, with EGMs located in clubs and hotels 
comprising the lion’s share (A$10.5 billion or 55%), followed by wagering – horses, 
                                                 
4 For instance, in its Budget Statement 2016–17 the NSW Treasury disaggregates all taxes derived from 
gambling and betting from FY 2014–15 over the forward estimates to 2019–20. In FY 2015–16 taxes from 
‘Club gaming machines’ and ‘Hotel gaming machines’ were recorded as A$778 million and A$681 million, 





greyhounds, sports-betting (A$2.8 billion or 15%) and lotteries (A$2.3 billion or 12%). 
Moreover, at that point in time VIP gambling in casinos accounted for only A$0.6 billion – 
3% overall, less than EGMs in casinos (A$1.4 billion or 7%) and Tables (A$1.4 billion or 
8%) (Productivity Commission 2010, 2.5). 
Of the 13 casinos presently operating in Australia, the only one trading without EGMs 
is the Canberra Casino, but even this is likely to change as it is earmarked for redevelopment 
into another large integrated resort (Johnson 2015) that is being designed by Cox Architects 
(the same firm responsible for The Star in Sydney). Although the Sydney Crown Casino has 
explicit restrictions mandating that there be no EGMs included in the design, the trajectory of 
casino development in Australia suggests that there is a high probability of the conversion of 
some gaming floor space to make way for EGM gambling (Markham, Doran, and Young 
2014). Arguably, from October 2016 this probability increased due to the Chinese 
Government curbing the activities of Crown in mainland China that were designed to capture 
the ‘high-roller’ market, consequently potentially cruelling the business model developed by 
Crown for Barangaroo and as understood by successive NSW governments (ABC 2017a).  
Despite these recent developments, seeing successful enterprises emerge in Asia in the 
last 15 years has provided case studies for the development of more, and bigger, casino 
resorts to become competitive in the current global market (Allen Consulting Group 2012). 
The upwardly mobile Chinese middle-class has been the primary target, and now the 
tightening of Chinese capital and corruption control in Macau presents opportunities for 
future Australian resorts to capture that share (Bloomberg 2015); notwithstanding recent 
events which have seen several Crown employees detained on mainland China – ostensibly 







3. Context: Darling Harbour, Pyrmont-Ultimo and Star Casino 
Darling Harbour 
It was in anticipation of the celebration of the bicentenary of Australian settlement in 1988 
that the Darling Harbour redevelopment was announced in 1984 (Punter 2005, 68). The 
project was couched in the rhetoric of attracting external capital and fostering the growing 
tourist market (Daly and Malone 1996, 96). The state government made plans to transform 
the ageing waterfront industrial zone that once served as a point of goods distribution into 
what is now a mixed-use precinct. This was populated with the usual trimmings: a convention 
centre, public boardwalk, hotels and recreational amenities like the now-closed Sega World 
indoor amusement park and the much-contested Monorail, a failed infrastructure project that 
was recently dismantled. To ensure completion for the 1988 bicentenary celebrations, the 
state took control of planning approvals in what is now common practice for significant 
landmark developments in the state capital cities, acting as both site owner and development 
authority (Searle and Bounds 1999, 169).  
Notwithstanding public backlash, the withdrawal of support from professional 
architecture and planning bodies and even changes in leadership of successive governments, 
the project was completed, although late, and is now generally accepted as successful by most 
accounts (Daly and Malone 1995, 105). The precinct is currently undergoing a significant 
facelift, arguably in response to regional competition from other state capitals (Pham 2015, 
3). This has necessitated constructing a new convention centre, public realm rehabilitation 






Figure 1:  Darling Harbour: Casino locations and sites of major development 
 
Source: The Authors. 
 
Pyrmont-Ultimo and Star Casino Resort 
As shown in Figure 1, the Star Casino sits adjacent to Darling Harbour on the western side of 
the bay. Although objected to by the (then) Sydney City Council (Council of the City of 
Sydney 1994), the state government announced in 1993 that a casino would be built on the 
site of the former Pyrmont power station (Searle and Cardew 2000, 368). This development 
proceeded in spite of a clear lack of citizen participation and council consent, and despite the 
fact that it contravened state planning policy (Searle and Bounds 1999, 169). State 
Environmental Planning Policy No.41 (SEPP 41) was gazetted and the development 





million (Searle and Cardew 2000, 369) that was marked for reducing state deficit and to fund 
desperately needed infrastructure projects. Such precedents are now commonplace, with state 
governments often intervening without consultation or reaching consensus with the local 
government (Johnston and Clegg 2012, 284; Searle and Byrne 2002, 14). 
With the legislative framework for Sydney’s first casino set, there was a call for 
prospective developers to submit design proposals for selection. Yet the development 
suffered delays and setbacks due to bids being cancelled after investigations found the 
operators having corrupt connections (USRC 2000, 50). In December 1994 Leighton 
Properties and Showboat were announced as the winners, with a temporary casino built on an 
adjacent site in 1995, functioning both as a test-bed for the main casino and to generate 
significant revenue before the permanent casino opened for business in November 1997. Cox 
Architects were appointed to design the casino, along with the convention centre (also on 
Darling Harbour). Following Philip Cox’s admission that The Star was ‘my worst building by 
far’ and that he wouldn’t be involved in a casino project again (Hasham 2013), his firm has 
since designed proposals for the casino resort in Canberra.  
The Star Casino, with its prime setting on the Sydney waterfront, offers easy access to 
punters with its own dedicated light rail, bus and ferry stops. Less conspicuous than the resort 
casinos of Las Vegas, the Star Casino integrated resort, although dominating in stature, fits 
more into its surrounds, occupying an expansive block built to a relatively low height with 
the podium reaching three storeys, the recently completed Darling Hotel at 12 storeys, and 
the Astral Tower and Residences at 15 storeys. The integrated resort attracts and contains 
patrons with an array of food and beverage offerings, and entertainment and conference 
facilities. The design of the casino resort is spatially read as a cohesive urban interior without 
clear distinction or delineation of separate functions throughout. Recent facelifts have 





to a changing light show. This shiny, undulating surface continues to the interior, blending 
the gaming, retail and dining experiences. The gaming gross floor area (GFA) totals 4.3 
hectares (the Melbourne Crown is 5 hectares), although the interior gaming floors have been 
planned for expansion. 
Since opening in 1997, the Star Casino has undergone regular upgrades. As the Star 
Casino’s exclusivity agreements with the NSW Government will lapse in 2019, a new era of 
competition is emerging with a partnership to deliver a 6-star Ritz-Carlton branded hotel to 
compete with Crown’s offering at Barangaroo.  
 
Table 2 Star Casino Resort and Crown Casino Resort compared 
 The Star Casino Resort Crown Casino Resort 
1. Existing site Power station Industrial dock 
2. Date announced 1989 2009 
3. Date approved 1994 2016 
4. Date opened Temporary casino 1995; permanent casino 1997 2020 (estimated) 
5. Licence cost 
Initial exclusive licence (1997–2009) and 99-year 
operating licence, A$376 million, extension of exclusive 
licence (2009–2019), A$250 million 
99-year operating license 
A$100 million 
6. Gaming GFA 4.3 hectares Up to 2 hectares or 20% GFA 
7. EGMs Yes No 
8. Theatre on site Yes No 
9. Residential on 
site 
Yes Yes 









Sources: Chew 2015; Daly and Malone 1995; Department of Planning 2016; Drew 2015; Hall and Hamon 1996; 
Lynch and Veal 1998; Markham, Doran, and Young 2014; Searle and Bounds 1999; Searle and 







The Barangaroo precinct (see Figure 1) is located on the edge of the CBD on a former 
shipyard, with adjacent working-class cottages that have mostly been rebuilt, renovated or 
converted to high-quality commercial or residential property. The site is also close to Millers 
Point, where rows of public housing are marked for sale and conversion that will change the 
social mix of the neighbourhood.5 The precinct was initiated through an international 
competitive process that attracted designs from a wide field of entries from both local and 
foreign firms. Although it was not the winner of the competition, the selected design came 
from a consortium led by Lendlease. The Barangaroo precinct development is a A$6 billion 
project on 22ha of land on the last open site in the City of Sydney. It has predictably piqued 
the interest of a wide range of stakeholders and commentators who have made their opinions 
known through responses to calls for public submissions and reporting in mainstream news 
channels (Pham 2015). 
As was there conflict in the competition process, there has also been no shortage of 
contention through the life of the development, with the Barangaroo process mirroring that of 
the Darling Harbour precinct in 1988 (see Table 2). The Barangaroo precinct is essentially an 
annexed parcel of land under state control in what is otherwise territory under the City of 
Sydney’s jurisdiction. The City of Sydney Council, and in particular the Lord Mayor, Clover 
Moore, has been critical of the Barangaroo development, with the latter resigning from her 
role on the Barangaroo Delivery Authority (BDA) in September 2010, citing a lack of 
transparency through procedure and information dissemination, and poor community 
consultation (Moore 2010). It can be argued that Sydney is the most important city in 
Australia, and it is images of Sydney that are most often conjured and recalled when 
considering Australia as an entity. It is also the city contributing most to GDP (SGS 
                                                 
5 The NSW Government (2017a) has launched a website advertising the properties for sale and highlighting 





Economics and Planning 2014, 3; 2017). As such, the configuration of its public space is 
important not only for its residents, but perhaps also its temporary residents, namely tourists 
visiting and transiting the city.6  
The Barangaroo precinct is divided into three parts: South, Central and Reserve. 
Barangaroo South was originally envisaged as the commercial sector that concentrated built 
form to the southern end of the site. The approved urban design characteristics have instead 
expanded the massing and shifted the apex of the site towards the centre of the precinct. This 
southern sector also seeks to expand its global credentials with significant development 
blocks and the tallest buildings in the precinct designed by world-renowned architecture 
studios: three slim residential towers designed by Renzo Piano Building Workshop and the 
Crown Casino Resort designed by Wikinson Eyre. Barangaroo Central is a mixed-use sector 
that is yet to have its design finalised, and Barangaroo Reserve, completed in 2015, save for a 
designated cultural space below the reserve called the ‘Cutaway’, features a ‘naturalised’ 
headland park designed by Peter Walker and Partners and Johnson Pilton Walker. As of June 
2016, Barangaroo South has seen the construction of the commercial towers completed – one 
of the initial precepts of the Barangaroo development was to address the shortage of prime-
grade office space in Sydney to attract global firms that require large contiguous floor-plates 
(Sussex and Penn 2011). 
Yet the entire development has been littered with controversy. As noted in the 
Introduction, early indications of the casino were presented as an unsolicited proposal in 
2009, with details held in secrecy as commercial-in-confidence and in direct consultation 
                                                 
6 Former Prime Minister Paul Keating imposed his influence on the design of the precinct, especially in the early 
stages of design development. Keating was first involved as a juror for the East Darling Harbour International 
Design Competition (now Barangaroo) and chaired the Design Excellence Review Panel (DERP), raising 
concerns of conflicts of interest (Stickells 2010). He successfully argued for the design and construction of the 
headland but distanced himself after the introduction of the casino resort into the masterplan (Davies 2015). 
Architectural historian Philip Drew (2015, 62) describes Keating as: ‘An opinionated amateur’, commenting of 







with the NSW Government (Chew 2015). Former Head of the NSW Independent Liquor and 
Gaming Authority, Chris Sidoti, stated: 
 
There was no public tender process and there was no public inquiry at any stage … as to the public 
benefit involved in this … I think that casinos are big money spinners and a licence to print money … 
The parliamentary scrutiny … was to my mind fairly superficial … I don’t think there was an appetite for 
thorough scrutiny … I think there was a wish simply to get the job done … (Sidoti, in ABC 2017a). 
 
Given a planning context where consultation with the community is legislatively mandated at 
the local government level, not just in NSW but also in many jurisdictions nationally (see 
Grant and Drew 2017, 226-243) this lack of a public inquiry or tender process is highly a-
typical7. Further, given that The Star is located in such close proximity it is difficult to justify 
the Crown Casino Resort at Barangaroo as a unique proposal. In 2010, MOD4 was approved 
by the Minister for Planning for a hotel on a newly built pier (Department of Planning 2010), 
and in 2013 Crown paid a A$100 million fee (notably less than that paid for Star City; see 
Table 2, Row 5) for the casino license to the NSW Government (Chew 2015, 30), allowing it 
to begin operating after Star Casino’s exclusivity agreement lapses.  
In particular, the unprecedented siting of a hotel on a newly built pier approved in 
MOD4 faced fierce opposition. The impact of the proposal would significantly change the 
built form principles of concentrating the tall buildings to the south of the site, instead 
shifting the apex north and west, extending off the foreshore and gaining privileged views 
over the Sydney CBD. Facing public backlash, this proposal was superseded by MOD8, 
which was approved in June 2016, with the hotel trading its position back onto the existing 
foreshore but adding additional bulk in the podium – over 100 metres taller – and is now 
defined by its principal function as a casino resort that incorporates a 6-star hotel and high-
                                                 
7 This lack of a formal consultation process did not stop an 11,000-signature petition opposing the development 
being submitted to parliament by the Sydney Lord Mayor Clover Moore in May 2011, forcing the issue to be 





end residential accommodation. From the available documents, the Crown Casino Resort will 
be clad in reflective glass, standing as an iconic landmark building and justified as becoming 
Sydney’s global calling-card. The building imposes itself on the foreshore promenade, 
dominating views from the public domain. Modelled after the petals of a flower, the Crown 
Casino Resort will be adorned with no fewer than 12 Crown logos on every face of its façade, 
from ground level to its uppermost point. Liberally using Crown’s brand visually scattered 
across the building calls to question the self-imbued ‘iconic’ status that was used to justify 
the design. 
The planned restriction to limit the casino to VIP gamblers propagates and extends 
notions of exclusivity. From the exterior thresholds, high-end dining expands the licensed 
area onto an already narrowed boardwalk, further restricting public use of an apparently 
public space. The planned gaming space is much smaller than the Star Casino, with approval 
for a maximum 2 hectares or 20% GFA. The two floors of VIP gaming in the podium are 
supplemented with an VIP area on the 25th and 26th floors.  
5 Contemporary global context 
Since casinos were developed in Las Vegas, they have undeniably been the world standard 
for creating profitable landscapes of consumption and desire. Yet by the turn of the 21st 
century attention had shifted to the Orient, with many states legalising gambling and a couple 
of city-states exceeding the turnover and profit of Las Vegas, which was first eclipsed by 
Macau in 2007 (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2011). The economics of casino gambling depend 
heavily on the mobility of people and capital. With the frames of reference constantly 
changing, modelling requires diligent updating of information relative to cited examples. 
Reports and assessments are often dated before they are published. Even more problematic is 
citing recent publications that quickly become dated under entropic global markets. For 





projections for Macau’s revenue forecast for 2011–2015 at US$34,608 million, US$44,862 
million, US$52,553, US$57,680 and US$62,167 (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2011). However, 
recorded returns were US$33,608, US$38,017, US$45,093, US$43,940 and US$28,920, 
respectively (UNLV 2015; GMA News Online 2016). Considering the discrepancy between 
these forecast and recorded figures, discord between expectations and results are also likely 
in future developments. 
Together with Macau, the development of casinos in the city-state of Singapore 
represents a new turn to an Oriental phase of casino development. The success of these 
ventures has also shifted the global locus of casino-centric development around these active 
hubs. As an island city-state, Singapore had its own challenges and to capture these global 
flows of capital had to respond to its own environmental limitations (Henderson 2012, 72). 
Considering the severe shortage of land in Singapore, the government exhibited significant 
foresight in devising a long-term concept plan in 1971, overseen by the Urban 
Redevelopment Authority (URA) that planned for a direction of development over a 40- to 
50-year timeframe, including revisions every decade (Henderson 2012, 72). More detailed 
master-plans followed from these medium-long-term plans, with the goals of maintaining a 
balance of growth, character and heritage. The Macau context follows similar but different 
constraints: again with highly restricting geographical boarders, the state has historically 
relied on land reclamation, with 50% of the territory reclaimed from the sea (Simpson 2014, 
831). 
In Macau the most recent significant impact on growth and generation of revenue has 
been the promotion of Xi Jinping to the position of General Secretary of the Communist 
Party of China (Chow 2015, 4). Since his appointment there has been a serious drive to 





significant impacts upon the profits of Macau’s casino resorts (Schneider 2015, 122), 
including that of Crown’s Studio City venture with Melco International (see ABC 2017a).  
The documents submitted by Crown Resorts supporting their development of a high 
rollers casino at Barangaroo (Allen Consulting Group 2012) reveals significant attention 
being paid to attracting the rising Chinese middle-class and to capitalise on their tastes and 
interests as easing travel restrictions contribute to their mobility and ability to access the 
Australian market. For instance, ‘White Papers’ from the NSW Government and casino 
development documents make comparisons with Macau and Singapore (Allen Consulting 
Group 2012; Productivity Commission 2010). This has been echoed more recently by the Star 
on its website: commenting on the unveiling of its hotel proposal, China is the only country 
singled out, highlighting the opportunities that Chinese tourists bring to the consumptive 
agglomerations that centres on casino tourism (The Star, n.d.; see also The Star 2016, 2).  
Although geographically it may seem suitable to draw upon the casinos of Macau and 
Singapore by way of example, in reality the development in Sydney is functionally closer to 
that of the Las Vegas market, closer to a tabula rasa typology with a dominant unitary 
market of casino tourism rather than an embedded development in an urban centre. Arguably, 
the archipelagos of spectacle from Las Vegas to Macau and Singapore are inherently not the 
best or most suitable models of comparison to drive the urban development of Sydney to 
compete for external capital in the face of slowing domestic production and exports (see IMF 
2017). This global ‘best-practice’ comparison leads to a temporal-spatial dissonance that 
disproportionately affects the residents and non-users. This spatial zone around the proposed 
Barangaroo casino resort radiates from its privileged centre through the entire precinct from 
the spectacle of the landmark building, the ‘elite’ intended audience and the encroachment on 






Image of the city 
Dissemination of city image often involves agglomerations of iconicity collated and 
packaged to deliver attractive visages that compel the tourist gaze to focus on the city. Icons 
of urban forms are often the highlights of the skyline that are, in most cases, tall buildings 
and monuments. The mainstays of iconic architectural elements in Sydney include the 
Harbour Bridge, Opera House and Sydney Tower. At 275m tall, after Sydney Tower the 
Crown Resort will be Sydney’s tallest, but sited on the foreshore’s edge it will have greater 
impact on the surrounding open public space. In his study of Melbourne’s skyline, Dovey 
(2010) noted the impact of these corporate towers as leading to the gradual expropriation of 
the city (Dovey, in Sklair 2010, 148). As the Crown Resort in Sydney will be positioned at 
the water’s edge, the impact will be greater than the towers in Dovey’s (2010) study. This 
domination of corporate imagery and the ideological shift from a public to private city can be 
visualised in what Norman Klein terms ‘scripted spaces’ (Klein 2004, 10). Just as 
Haussmann’s Paris project expelled hundreds of thousands of people in the 1870s (Urry and 
Larsen 2011, 160) Sydney will also be sanitised, clearing the paths of the tourist gaze to see 
exactly what the state dictates. 
Sydney is positioning itself in the direction of a unique global city that is looking closer 
to the Indo-Pacific, as alluded to in recent White Papers (Australian Government, 2013). 
Except Singapore, which has redefined itself through its casino resorts (Seng 2005, 259-260), 
Sydney is the only Alpha + or Alpha ++ city on the Global and World City database with a 
major casino resort (see, for example, GaWC 2012). With the two casinos soon to be within 
eyesight and 1000 metres of each other, there is a strong weight of shifting identity to a city 
that chooses to redefine itself from an exemplar of high liveability and lifestyle to that of 





As Pop Art eroded the distinction between historically understood high and low art, so 
too has the international style opened the market for buildings of distinctive yet questionable 
taste in the public eye. The erosion of hegemony between buildings and monuments and 
architecture and monument (Sklair and Gherardi 2012, 58) has allowed the dominant public 
opinion, as directed through media and press popularity, to imbue any building as icon. As 
much as Crown Resorts predicates the need for an iconic building, justifying the size, height, 
function and position on the waterfront to allow their allegory to continue, it places in their 
hands far too much power to dominate the public realm in what should be genuinely public 
space. Justifying the position and size of the Crown Resorts building as a necessary spectacle 
overturning the state planning policy (Drew 2015, 64) is hubristic to say the least.  
Otherwise stated, it ought to be recognised that these developments are spawned from 
success stories incumbent on local specificity (e.g., the Bilbao Effect),8 and these ‘best-
practice’ models of development are problematic: mobilities of ideology importing constructs 
built in specific contexts then transplanted in foreign landscapes. The desire to construct 
integrated resorts that follow closely the models of the Orient, sites that lack the historical 
specificity of cities such as Sydney, leads to the development of dull, inert cities (Jacobs 
1961, 442). This process of reterritorialising the urban landscape also draws comparison to 
the colonial past, on this very site and dictating ‘a new form of “colonisation”, crowding out 
the potential for local invention’ (Healey, in Hillier 2013, 105). The urban landscapes of 
cities develop slowly over time, gradually forming their own genius loci. These processes are 
inherently messy and as such do not have the luxury of a tabula rasa approach to 
development. 
 
                                                 
8 The ‘Bilbao Effect’ refers to the revitalisation project of the existing industrial waterfront in Bilbao, Spain 
through the conflation of the star architect designing iconic buildings, museums and cultural artefacts attracting 
the growth of tourism into the city. This exemplar has drawn the gaze of numerous ailing cities, spawning 





Selling the image, marketing and image agglomerations 
As we imitate global exemplars ascribing the waterfront to a successful platform to share to 
the world, and after using key images of famous structures and views to frame the 
perspective, how are we to shift the gaze from global Sydney to local Sydney? The Opera 
House and Harbour Bridge are recognisable icons, with the seduction of Bondi’s beach and 
the Blue Mountains stretching the spatial imaginary. As the contingent forms of 
redevelopment in post-industrial cities, waterfront developments are the jewel in the crown 
for cities exemplifying their capacity for innovation, reputation and seduction. But without 
any indicators or visual markers to direct our gaze, how are we to make the claim that these 
environments are specific to their context? The casino resorts of Macau and Singapore 
certainly exhibit the spectacle and fanfare to capture our attention, but let us consider the 
existing character of Sydney before the complete reformation of its image. 
Bourdieu’s (1984) habitus is something ignored in the face of globalisation and 
international competition that is having significant impact on the spaces being constructed in 
our cities. The identity that is built up over the course of many decades holds for little in the 
face of developers promising billions in tax revenue and revitalised landscapes, as the case of 
The Star and incoming Crown Casino Resort at Barangaroo. Closing the eastern edge of 
Darling Harbour, Barangaroo follows this as the defining characteristic for its development, 
consumptionscapes that implicitly deny access by way of design determinism and spatial 
construction. These development strategies limit human habitation to predefined consumptive 
activities and the temporal-spatial effects of these strictures prioritise the supply of leisure for 
a global audience. 
 





Although gambling addiction affects a small number of people (Productivity Commission 
2010) the social cost is disproportionately weighted to those in weaker economic positions. It 
is difficult to agree on an accurate figure of the cost, with some estimates of the worst case 
over 10 times that of the best cases, but in Australia the Productivity Commission has drawn 
a figure of A$4.7 billion a year (Productivity Commission 2010, 2) which still leaves their 
estimate of total economic gain, including the recreational value, as between A$3.7 and 
A$11.1 billion. As a conflation of quantitative and qualitative measures, this interpretation 
and resolution can be problematic. As gambling is a legalised industry, and legislation falls 
under state government, duty of care essentially falls to the state (Walker 1998, 25) and, 
considering who is harmed, it is reasonable to assume that there may be other actors affecting 
the laws and regulations.  
In the case of The Star in Pyrmont, establishing a casino resort in an existing residential 
neighbourhood accelerated the gentrifying process, pushing up market prices of buildings and 
units, and also displacing other business activities, instead pushing revenue through the 
casino (USRC 2000, 57). With the anticipated Crown Casino Resort, if it proceeds according 
to plan, the casino and its surrounds will be limited to ‘high-rollers’, shorting any chance of 
social cohesion and diversity in the area. On the other hand, if the outcome follows the casino 
resorts that have been developed in Australia thus far, the socioeconomic consequences will 
shift from exclusion reverting to one of social harm associated with EGM gambling. The net 
gain is limited to the taxation returns to the NSW Government and the benefits of these 
consumptionscapes to casual users and residents are limited to the use of the casino resort 
services that will be strictly pay-per-use. Moreover, it is worth emphasising that the NSW 
Government is budgeting for a marked increase in taxation revenue from casinos over the 
forward estimates, from A$282 million in 2017–18 to A$414 million in FY 2019–20 – a 





expecting a significant increase in revenues from casinos when Crown is scheduled to 
become operational in 2019–20 (see NSW Government 2016, 5–7). 
 
6  Conclusion and observations 
Although Sydney is widely considered the financial and creative capital of Australia (Hu, 
Blakeley, and Zhou 2013, 442) the increasing reliance on, and power given to, the developers 
of casino resorts has led to an increasingly monocultural spatial outcome of Sydney’s 
foreshore. These developments that are dominated by a single actor create environments that 
lack vitality, with a commercial agenda predicated primarily on future – and perhaps 
unrealistic – expectations of a continuing influx of Chinese casino tourism dollars (see ABC 
2017a). This has followed from the success of casino tourist models of the Orient with the 
operators of Crown forming a partnership with its Asian counterpart.  
As discussed in this article, the Barangaroo precinct development, and the Crown 
Casino resort in particular, continue a cycle of major project development where the state has 
taken control from local government over project determinations (see Table 1). This nested 
hierarchy has also allowed controversial projects like the Crown Casino to pass through 
planning processes without opportunity for thorough interrogation and public debate and, 
arguably, where the promise of increased state revenues has quickened the process in a way 
that is unjustifiable. Waterfront developments are significant projects and should be overseen 
by higher tiers of government, but that should not discount the importance of the local over 
global loci. Although Sydney is a ‘Global City’, it is also home to an existing resident base. 
In this article there has not been space to examine the lack of public housing in the 
surrounding area (Pham in press), nor the impact of the casino resort on its future provision. 
Yet the Crown Casino resort should be viewed with the implicit effects of its erection, not 





melds into the agglomeration of its imagery in justifying the resort as requisite promoting 
Sydney’s global attributes.  
We have found that, instead of planning for diversity, the outcomes have intensified 
land use in successive foreshore developments. Pushing the limits of design is essential to the 
invention or reinvention of an urban renewal project such as Barangaroo, but transformation 
and progression could be achieved more implicitly through structural reform. This strategy 
rekindles the position of many urbanists of the past, from Mumford and Jacobs (1961) to 
Jencks (2006) and Gehl (2013). All observed the importance of identity and community in 
successful built environments that are contingent on a multitude of small statements. These 
are the details that bind identity to environment, generating the baseline for vibrant, inclusive 
communities that are becoming increasingly more difficult to achieve in a rapidly globalising 
city. This introspection may be at first appear to slow or hinder the rate of development, but 
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